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Abstract
A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication
network, where some nodes are controlled by an adversary. We characterize the
directed networks for which there exist ε-secret and ε-strongly secure communi-
cation protocols (∀ε > 0): if all nodes are obedient the receiver learns the secret
with probability at least 1 − ε and no information is leaked (secrecy), and this
property is maintained under every strategy of the adversary (security). For se-
crecy, a necessary and sufficient condition is that there is a directed path from
the sender to the receiver, and for each possible adversarial coalition A, there
is an undirected path from the sender to the receiver that contains no node in
A. For security, a necessary and sufficient condition is that for every possible
adversarial coalition A, the graph obtained by removing all nodes in A still has
the previous property.
Keywords: secure communication, protocols, communication.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82
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1 Introduction
The problem. This paper studies the problem of secure transmission of messages
between a sender and a receiver on a network. The sender wishes to transmit a secret
(private information) to the receiver through the network. The difficulty is that nodes
might be curious, faulty, and malevolent (for short, adversarial), and that the identity
of adversarial nodes is unknown to the sender and receiver. Nodes (players) in the
network receive messages on in-going edges and send messages on out-going edges.
A communication protocol specifies the messages nodes can receive and send at each
round of communication (a game-form) and the messages nodes send at each round as
a function of the messages received and sent in all previous rounds (a strategy profile).
A communication protocol is strongly secure if it satisfies (i) secrecy: if the nodes
correctly execute the protocol, the receiver correctly learns the secret of the sender
and no information is leaked, and (ii) security/reliability: even if a group of nodes (an
adversary) mis-execute the protocol, no information is leaked and the receiver learns
the secret with arbitrary high probability. This paper characterizes the networks for
which there exists a strongly secure communication protocol.
Motivation. Problems of secure transmission of messages are natural in computer
science where a communication network represents agents sending messages (emails)
along physical wires and adversarial players are hackers. Since the very beginning of
electronic communication, security of messages has been a central concern, and there is
a large literature on these issues (on communication networks and secure transmission
of messages, see e.g., Dolev et al, 1993, or Franklin and Wright, 2000). The present
paper contributes to this literature in considering the general class of directed networks;
most of this literature considers undirected networks. We explain in greater details the
connections of our work with this literature in a later section.
Yet, the primary motivation for our work is the study of game theoretic problems.
Indeed, problems of secure transmission of messages are easily formalized as dynamic
games. As a first example, consider a model a` la Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which
the sender and the receiver have common interests. If the sender could communicate
directly with the receiver, the most efficient equilibrium would be for the sender to re-
port truthfully his private information. Suppose now that the sender and the receiver
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are distant nodes in the network and that some other players (nodes) have opposite
interests. The possibility of achieving perfect communication in equilibrium is tightly
related to the existence of a secure communication protocol: if such a protocol ex-
ists, then no player can alter communication by deviating, interpreting a deviation as
adversarial behavior. The equivalence between secure communication protocols and
fully revealing equilibria in cheap-talk games with incomplete information is studied
in details in Renault and Tomala (2004).
As a second example, Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999) and Renou and Tomala
(2012) study mechanism design problems when not all agents are able to directly and
privately communicate with the principal1. The information agents like to transmit to
the principal has to go through a network (the hierarchy). If one wants to implement
any incentive-compatible social choice function, the problem is essentially a problem
of secure transmission of messages. Intuitively, any agent must be able to securely and
reliably transmit his private information to the principal. If not, either the principal
receives an erroneous information and thus does not implement the right decision, or
agents might have an incentive to mis-report their private information, if information
about the private information of others is leaked to them.2
As another example, consider an infinitely repeated game. If players want to en-
force a cooperative behavior (e.g., monopoly pricing), players may need to punish the
deviating players upon detecting deviations from the cooperative behavior. Detecting
and punishing a deviating player may prove particularly difficult if monitoring is im-
perfect and private, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006). For instance, suppose, that
players are on a network and can only observe the actions of their neighbors. To enforce
the cooperative behavior, players observing a deviation from a neighbor would need
to reliably signal the identity of the deviator (the private information) to the other
players in order for the punishment phase to start. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996)
and Renault and Tomala (1998) study this problem and link the possibility of obtain-
ing cooperative equilibria with the topology of the network. Tomala (2011) describes
1There is also a related literature on distributed mechanism design, see e.g. Shneidman and Parkes,
2004.
2Recall that the incentive compatibility of a social choice function means that no agent has an
incentive to mis-report his private information when he expects others to report truthfully their
private information and has no additional information about their private information than his prior
information.
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communication protocols for the identification and communication of the identity of a
deviating player.
As yet another motivating problem, consider the implementation of correlated or
communication equilibria by unmediated communication, see Forges (1990), Barany
(1992), Ben-Porath (2003), Gerardi (2004), Abraham et al. (2006, 2008). This litera-
ture is essentially based on communication protocols possessing secrecy properties. An
essential assumption in that literature is that players can communicate face to face (a
complete network). To extend these results to more general communication networks,
a careful study of the problem of secure transmission of messages seems a prerequisite.
Contributions. This paper generalizes previous results in the computer science lit-
erature on secure transmission of messages. Two seminal contributions are Dolev et
al. (1993) and Franklin and Wright (2000). Both papers consider undirected networks
where messages can travel both ways on edges. Moreover, the networks are simple in
that they are made of parallel lines of edges. The study of general undirected networks
was done by Renault and Tomala (2008) and others, see references therein. Our main
contribution is to consider general directed networks, where information can flow in
only one direction.3
Our central result is to characterize the directed networks for which strongly secure
transmission of messages is possible. We start by assuming that for each node i, there
exists a directed path from i to the receiver. This is without loss of generality. Clearly,
the sender must have a directed path to the receiver if he is to transmit his secret.
Suppose now that there is a non-empty set of nodes with no directed path to the
receiver. All these nodes cannot send messages to the other nodes, i.e., the nodes
with a directed path to the receiver, and are therefore irrelevant for the transmission
of messages from the sender to the receiver. There is thus no loss of generality in
removing such nodes from the network.
With this preparation done, as a first step, we study the problem of secret commu-
nication, that is, communication protocols such that, if all players execute the protocol
obediently, then the receiver learns the secret, and the messages jointly obtained by any
3Note that Dolev et al (1993) and Franklin and Wright (2000) do not formalize their analysis in
game-theoretic terms, while Renault and Tomala (2008) do.
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adversarial coalition do not reveal any information about the content of the secret. Our
first result, Theorem 1, states that a necessary and sufficient condition for secret com-
munication is that for any possible adversarial coalition A, there exists an undirected
path (i.e., a path in the associated undirected graph) from the sender to the receiver
that does not intersect A. A distinctive feature of this result is to relate the possibility
of secret communication with the topology of the associated undirected graph, i.e., the
graph obtained from the original directed graph by replacing all directed edges with
undirected edges. For the proof of this result, we construct a protocol that makes use
of encoding techniques and show that our connectivity condition implies that only the
receiver is able to decode the message correctly.
Our main theorem, Theorem 2, then states that strongly secure transmission of
messages (the adversary can now deviate from the protocol) is possible if and only if
for any adversarial coalition A, the network obtained by deleting all nodes in A and
their adjacent edges satisfies the condition of Theorem 1. Precisely, in the network
obtained by deleting all nodes in A, each remaining node has a directed path to the
receiver, and for any possible adversarial coalition A′, there exists an undirected path
from the sender to the receiver that does not intersect A′.
A building block of our main proof is a secret sharing protocol (see, e.g., Shamir,
1979, and Beimel, 2011, for a recent survey). The sender (the dealer) breaks the secret
into a number of shares (one share per neighbor) such that all shares are required
for recovering the secret, and no information is leaked. In turn, each neighbor of the
sender must deal shares of their “secret” (i.e., all messages they have received and keys
generated) to their immediate neighbors, and so on. The core of the proof is to show
that no adversarial coalition can obtain enough shares to learn the secret. Another
aspect is that any adversarial coalition can mis-execute the protocol. From a computer
science viewpoint, this corresponds to potentially dishonest dealers and shareholders
and, thus, corresponds to verifiable secret sharing schemes (see, e.g., Chor et al., 1985).
There is also a large literature in computer science that studies rational secret
sharing in game-theoretic terms (see among others Abraham et al., 2006, Gordon and
Katz, 2006, Halpern and Teague, 2004, Kol and Naor, 2008). This literature provides
an important bridge between computer science and game theory, since nodes can be
rational entities (firms, consumers, voters, etc) that respond to incentives, as the above
economic examples attest. Our work also adopts this view. We stress, however, that
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the main contribution of the paper is about the topology of the network for which secure
information transmission is possible, and not about the protocols for secret sharing.
An important technical result for our analysis is the cut lemma. Suppose that the
nodes of the graph of communication are partitioned into three subsets S, A, and R
such that the sender is in S, the receiver is in R, and all paths from S to R intercept
A, so that A is a cut of the graph. The cut lemma states that if the histories of
messages received and sent by A are independent of the histories of messages received
and sent by S, so are the histories of R. A direct consequence is that if A does not learn
the secret of S, then R does not either. This result is often referred to in computer
science, and the usual strategy of proof is based on entropy (see e.g, Maurer, 1999).
However, this type of proof does not extend easily to directed networks (see Lemma
2 below and the example following it). To contrast with, our proof uses an auxiliary
three-player repeated game with an imperfect information structure that replicates the
structure of observation implied by the network. This demonstrates the power of the
game-theoretic language.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on secure transmission
of messages. Dolev et al. (1993) consider undirected networks composed of n vertex-
disjoint paths from the sender to the receiver, unicast communication, and assume that
an adversary controls at most k nodes.4 These authors show that in 1-way problems,
i.e., if the information flows only from the sender to the receiver, a sufficient and nec-
essary condition for the secure transmission of information is the 3k + 1-connectivity
of the network, while in 2-way problems, i.e., when the sender and the receiver “con-
verse,” a sufficient and necessary condition is the 2k + 1-connectivity of the network.5
Similarly, considering undirected but broadcast networks, Franklin and Wright (2000)
show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the secure transmission of messages is
the 2k+1-connectivity of the network. Renault and Tomala (2008) generalize Franklin
and Wright’s results to general undirected networks. Considering directed networks
4Dolev et al. distinguish between listening adversaries and disrupting adversaries. Here, we assume
that adversaries are both listening and disrupting adversaries, the containment assumption.
5Dolev et al. actually prove stronger results: the 2k + 1-connectivity of the network is necessary
and sufficient for perfect security, i.e., when with probability one the receiver correctly learns the
secret and no information is leaked.
7
(but still composed of vertex-disjoint paths), Desmedt and Wang (2002) show that if
there are 3k + 1 − u ≥ 2k + 1 disjoint paths from the sender to the receiver and u
disjoint paths from the receiver to the sender (these u paths are also disjoint from the
3k + 1 − u paths from the sender to the receiver), then perfectly secure transmission
of messages can be achieved.
Our main contribution to this literature is to consider general directed networks and
general adversaries. The novelty of our results is to obtain characterizations in terms of
the connectivity of the undirected graph associated with the directed network.A closely
related study is Jain (2002) who also considers general directed networks. Jain (2002)
studies a variant of secret transmission —in that he assumes that nodes are obedient
and that the adversary may only eavesdrop on some edges—and constructs a protocol
which is similar to the one we use for proving Theorem 1. However, Jain (2002) does
not consider security, i.e. the possibility that the adversary deviates from the protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents formally the model and the
main definitions. We give in Section 3 the characterization of secret communication,
and the main result about strongly secure communication is in Section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper with comments and open problems. Some technical proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Communication on networks
This section presents our model of communication on networks and defines the concepts
of information-theoretic secrecy and security. We define communication protocols and
strategies using concepts and terminologies borrowed from game theory.
2.1 The communication network.
A sender S and a receiver R are two distant nodes in a directed graph, or digraph,
G = (V , E), where V is a finite set of vertices ({S,R} ⊆ V) and E ⊆ V×V is a finite set
of edges. Each vertex is a player and directed edges represent direct communication
links. For each i ∈ V , we denote D(i) = {j : (j, i) ∈ E} the set of predecessors of i and
C(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} the set of successors. The sender privately knows a secret θ,
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a realization of the random variable θ˜, drawn from a finite set Θ according to a given
probability distribution P (we assume P (θ˜ = θ) > 0 for each θ ∈ Θ).
The digraph G represents the communication possibilities, i.e., a player receives
messages sent by his predecessors and send messages to his successors. Communication
is point-to-point, that is, a message sent by player i to player j on the edge (i, j) is
private and secure: no other player can eavesdrop on the edge (i, j) or control the flow
of information.
2.2 Strategies and protocols.
A communication protocol on a digraph G is informally described as follows. There
are multiple rounds and, at each round, a set of players is active and send messages to
their successors. Communication is assumed to be synchronous: at a given round, all
messages are sent simultaneously, and each player is only informed of the messages he
has sent and received before that round; unicast: a player can send different messages
to different successors; and randomized: messages may depend on random inputs pri-
vately chosen. A protocol specifies message spaces, the strategy used by each player to
generate the messages he sends, given the messages he received and his random inputs,
and how the receiver decodes the secret from his messages.
More formally, players communicate for T < ∞ rounds. At each round t ≤ T ,
player i can send a message mtij ∈ M tij to player j ∈ C(i). We assume that all message
spaces are finite and that there exists a null (silent) message m0 ∈ M tij for all i, for all
j ∈ C(i), for all t. A period-t history hti for player i is the list of messages received
and sent before round t and is an element of H ti := (×j∈C(i)M1ij)× (×j∈D(i)M1ji)× · · ·×
(×j∈C(i)M t−1ij )× (×j∈D(i)M t−1ji ), denote H1i := {∅} the initial empty history. A period-t
strategy σti for player i ∈ V \ {S} is a map from H ti to Δ(×j∈C(i)Mij).6 A period-t
strategy for the sender is a map σtS from Θ×H ti to Δ(×j∈C(i)M tij). A strategy σi for a
player is a collection (σ1i , . . . , σ
T
i ) of strategies for each period. A strategy thus defines
the messages player i sends to his successors as a function of the messages he has
received and sent and possibly some coin tosses. In the sequel, for any strategy profile
σ, for any subset of nodes A, we write σA for (σi)i∈A and σ−A for (σi)i/∈A. Finally,
θd : H
T+1
R → Θ ∪ {Pb} defines the decoding function of the receiver. As a function of
6For any finite set X, Δ(X) denotes the set of probability distributions over X.
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all the messages he has received and sent, the receiver can either output a secret or
declares that there is a problem. For instance, if the receiver is confronted with two
incompatible messages like “the secret is θ” and “the secret is θ∗”, he might simply
declare that there is a problem instead of choosing a particular secret.
Definition 1 A communication protocol consists of a strategy profile σ and a decoding
function θd.
Let 〈σ, θd〉 be a communication protocol, denote Pσ the probability distribution over
histories and secrets induced by the strategy profile σ. By convention, we assume that
if the history ht has probability zero under σ, then Pσ(θ˜ = θ|ht) is defined as P (θ˜ = θ).
Note that a profile of strategies σ together with a decoding function θd induce a random
variable θˆd with values on Θ ∪ {Pb}, with Pσ(θˆd = θ) =
∑
hT+1R :θd(h
T+1
R )=θ
Pσ(h
T+1
R ).
2.3 Adversaries.
There is a collection A of potential adversaries. Each A ∈ A is a subset of V \ {S,R}.
For instance, given an integer k, A may be the collection of all subsets of V \ {S,R}
with at most k elements. We allow an adversary to correlate its play, i.e., we allow
for strategies of the form τ tA : H
t
A → Δ(×i∈A ×j∈C(i) M tij), where H tA = ∪i∈AH ti . An
adversary A can condition its play at round t on all messages sent and received by
all nodes in A up to round t. Implicitly, players in A have access to an underlying
communication network to share their information and are not constrained by the
network G.
The goal of the sender is to send a message to the receiver without the adversary
being able to learn or to manipulate the content of the message (the secret).7
2.4 Secrecy and security.
Definition 2 A protocol 〈σ, θd〉 is ε-secret if it satisfies the following requirements:
7Here, we have in mind that the sender and the receiver are better off when the receiver correctly
outputs the secret of the sender. For instance, suppose that upon decoding the secret to be θ′, the
receiver takes decision f(θ′). Assume that the sender and the receiver have the utility function u with
u(f(θ), θ) > u(f(θ′), θ) for all (θ, θ′), while any other node has the utility function −u. Clearly, the
receiver and the sender are better off when the receiver correctly outputs the secret, while all other
nodes are worse off. If they can, they will disrupt the communication.
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1. The receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1− ε, that is, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
Pσ(θˆd = θ˜|θ˜ = θ) ≥ 1− ε.
2. No adversary gets information about the secret, that is, ∀A ∈ A, ∀hT+1A , ∀θ ∈ Θ,
Pσ(θ˜ = θ|hT+1A ) = P (θ˜ = θ).
A communication protocol is ε-secret if the receiver learns the private information
(secret) of the sender with arbitrarily high probability and no adversary A with un-
bounded computational power controlling all nodes in A (and knowing the protocol)
gains additional information about the secret. Notice that the probabilities are eval-
uated under σ, i.e., whenever the players correctly execute the protocol. This type of
adversary is referred to as “honest but curious” in the computer science literature.
We now consider a stronger requirement: the protocol must be secret whenever
the players abide by the protocol, and if an adversary deviates from the protocol, the
deviation is detected with arbitrarily high probability. An important motivation for this
stronger requirement comes from mechanism design models (see Renou and Tomala,
2012) where the receiver is a decision maker who takes an action that affects the utility
of all players, even adversarial ones. For instance, suppose that upon detecting a
deviation, the receiver can take an action that imposes a large punishment on all the
players. The threat of a punishment upon detection, which would happen with a large
probability if the protocol has the aforementioned properties, would then deter players
from deviating, i.e., to become adversarial.
Definition 3 A protocol 〈σ, θd〉 is ε-secret with δ-detection if it is ε-secret and satisfies
the following additional requirement:
3. If an adversary deviates from the protocol, the receiver either correctly learns the
secret or detects a problem, i.e., for all A ∈ A, for all τA, PτA,σ−A(θˆd ∈ {θ˜,Pb}) ≥
1− δ.
Note that if a communication protocol is secret with detection, the receiver detects
with arbitrary high probability a deviation from the protocol, but may not learn the
secret upon detection of the deviation. The next concept we introduce imposes that
even if an adversary deviates, the protocol remains secret, i.e., the receiver still learns
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the secret with high probability and no other players get additional information about
the secret.
Definition 4 A protocol 〈σ, θd〉 is ε-strongly secure if for any adversary A and any
deviation τA from the protocol,
1. The receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1− ε, that is, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
PτA,σ−A(θˆd = θ˜|θ˜ = θ) ≥ 1− ε.
2. No adversary gets information about the secret, that is, ∀A′ ∈ A, ∀hT+1A′ , ∀θ ∈ Θ,
PτA,σ−A(θ˜ = θ|hT+1A′ ) = P (θ˜ = θ).
In other words, for any adversary A ∈ A, for any τA, the protocol 〈(τA, σ−A), θd〉 is
ε-secret.
A communication protocol is ε-strongly secure if it is ε-secret, and even if an adver-
sary deviates from the protocol, the receiver still learns the secret with high probability
and no other adversary gets additional information about the secret. This is stronger
than the classical definition of security in computer science. Indeed, the classical defi-
nition requires that the receiver correctly learns the secret even if an adversary deviates
from the protocol, that no adversary gains information by deviating, but does not re-
quire further secrecy requirement following a deviation. In particular, it might be that
for the receiver to learn the secret after a deviation, other nodes have to learn it too,
see the concluding example. Note that if a protocol is ε-strongly secure, then it is
clearly ε-secret with ε-detection (i.e., Definition 4 implies Definition 3).
2.5 Connectivity.
Security and secrecy clearly cannot be achieved for all graphs and all adversaries. For
instance, this is impossible if the adversary controls all nodes in the network and if
the receiver is not a successor of the sender. We introduce now some connectivity
conditions.
A directed path (dipath) γ is a finite sequence of vertices (i1, . . . , in) such that
ik+1 ∈ C(ik) for each k < n. The vertex i1 is the origin of the path and the vertex in is
its end-point. The digraph is strongly 1-connected from i to R, if there is a dipath with
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origin i and end-point R. The digraph is strongly 1-connected to R if it is strongly
1-connected from i to R, for all i ∈ V \ {R}.
We assume throughout that the digraph G is strongly 1-connected to R. Clearly, the
sender must have a directed path to the receiver to be able to transmit his information.
Moreover, if player i ∈ V\{S,R} has no directed path to the receiver, then i is irrelevant
for the transmission of information: either i is a sink or all directed paths starting at
i terminate at a sink i′ = i or loop back to i. Strong 1-connectedness is thus without
loss of generality.
With the digraph G, we associate the undirected graph G obtained from G by
disregarding the orientation of the edges. An undirected path (simply a path) is a
finite sequence of vertices i1, . . . , in such that ik+1 ∈ C(ik) ∪D(ik) for each k < n.
Definition 5 Given a collection A of subsets of nodes, the digraph G is weakly A-
connected from i to R, if for each A ∈ A, there exists an undirected path from i to R
with no vertex in A.
When A is the collection of all subsets with at most k nodes, the undirected graph G
is said to be k-connected and the digraph G is said to be weakly k-connected (see e.g.
Bang-Jensen and Gutin, 2007, Chapter 1, pages 16–22).
2.6 Acyclic graphs.
The digraph is acyclic if each vertex appears at most once in each dipath. An important
implication of acyclicity is the existence of a timing structure (i.e., an acyclic ordering).
Lemma 1 Let G be acyclic. There exists an integer T and a function t : V →
{1, . . . , T} such that for each i ∈ V, t(i) = 1 + max{t(j) : j ∈ D(i)}.
With an acyclic graph, players do not receive feedback about the execution of the
protocol. Thus, using the timing structure, we can restrict attention to protocols
where each player i sends messages only at round t(i), after having received messages
from all his predecessors. Acyclic graphs are central to the proof of Theorem 1.
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3 Secrecy
Theorem 1 Let G be strongly 1-connected to R. The following statements are equiv-
alent:
1. The graph G is weakly A-connected from S to R.
2. For each ε > 0, there exists an ε-secret protocol.
3. For each δ > 0, there exists a 0-secret protocol with δ-detection.
This result gives a simple characterization of secrecy. Remarkably, only the connectiv-
ity of the associated undirected network matters (given that the networks is strongly
1-connected to R). Also, requiring detection on top of secrecy does not affect the
connectivity requirements.
We prove first (2) ⇒ (1), thereby showing the necessity of weak A-connectedness.
Then, we show that this condition is sufficient, i.e., (1) ⇒ (3). Since (3) obviously
implies (2), the proof will be complete.
3.1 Proof of necessity[(2) =⇒ (1)]
The main tool is the fundamental next lemma. Suppose that there is a set of vertices
A such that all (directed and undirected) paths from S to R intersect A, i.e. A is a cut
of the graph. Lemma 2 states that if the histories (of messages sent and received) of
the sender, are independent of the histories (of messages sent and received) of A, then
the histories of the sender are also independent of the histories (of messages sent and
received) of the receiver. The general statement is the following.
Lemma 2 (Cut) Let S1, S2 and S3 be three disjoint subsets of nodes such all paths
from S1 to S3 intersect S2, i.e., S2 is a cut of the graph. For any σ, for any t, for any
ht, we have Pσ(h
t)Pσ(h
t
2) = Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2)Pσ(h
t
2, h
t
3), where h
t
1 = (h
t
i)i∈S1, h
t
2 = (h
t
i)i∈S2,
and ht3 = (h
t
i)i∈S3.
The proof is in Appendix. A direct implication of the lemma, with S1 being the
sender, S2 = A and S3 the receiver, is that the histories of messages sent and received
by the receiver are independent of the secret when the histories of messages sent and
received by the cut are independent.
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While the intuition of the lemma is clear, we could not find a proof in the litera-
ture. In particular, let us stress that conditioning on messages both sent and received
is crucial. For instance, it can be that the histories of messages sent by the cut are
independent of the secret and yet the histories of messages sent and received by the
receiver are not. For an example, consider Figure 1, where θ ∈ {0, 1}, X is a random
uniform draw from {0, 1} and addition is modulo 2. The message sent by A is indepen-
dent of θ (see Lemma 3) and yet the messages received by R are not (there are indeed
perfectly correlated with θ).
R
A
S
A′
θ
X + θ
X
X
Figure 1: A is a cut.
Now, we prove [(2) =⇒ (1)]. Let us assume that the digraph G is not weakly
A-connected from S to R, that is, there exists a set A ∈ A such that all (directed and
undirected) paths from S to R intersect A, i.e. A is a cut. Let ε < 1−maxθ′∈Θ P (θ′)
and suppose by contradiction that there exists a protocol 〈σ, θd〉 that is ε-secret. In
particular, this implies that Pσ(θ˜ = θ|hT+1A ) = P (θ˜ = θ) for each hT+1A and Pσ(θˆd =
θ˜|θ˜ = θ) > 1− ε, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
From Lemma 2, for every terminal history hT+1S , h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R , we have:
Pσ(h
T+1
S , h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R )Pσ(h
T+1
A ) = Pσ(h
T+1
S , h
T+1
A )Pσ(h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R ).
The history of the sender hT+1S contains the secret. We fix θ in Θ, h
T+1
A and h
T+1
R and
sum over all histories hT+1S that are compatible with θ and h
T+1
A . We obtain:
Pσ(θ, h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R )Pσ(h
T+1
A ) = Pσ(θ, h
T+1
A )Pσ(h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R ).
Using the assumption Pσ(θ, h
T+1
A ) = P (θ)Pσ(h
T+1
A ), we get:
Pσ(θ, h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R ) = P (θ)Pσ(h
T+1
A , h
T+1
R ),
15
i.e., the entire profile of messages received and sent by the cut and the receiver is
independent of θ˜. In particular, the profile of messages received and sent by the receiver
is independent of θ˜. It follows that θˆd is independent from θ˜ and, therefore, Pσ(θˆd =
θ˜) =
∑
θ Pσ(θˆd = θ)P (θ) < maxθ∈Θ P (θ) < 1− ε.
For secrecy, we need Pσ(θˆd = θ˜|θ˜ = θ) > 1 − ε for all θ, thus Pσ(θˆd = θ˜) > 1 − ε,
the required contradiction. 
3.2 Proof of sufficiency[(1) ⇒ (3)]
The proof is constructive and divided into several steps. First, in subsections 3.2.1
to 3.2.4, we construct a protocol for an acyclic digraph and prove that it is 0-secret.
Second, in subsection 3.2.5, we modify it in order to construct a protocol which is 0-
secret with δ-detection. Finally, in subsection 3.2.6, we show how to adapt the protocol
to any digraph, i.e., without the acyclicity assumption.
3.2.1 The ACY protocol.
In this section, we consider acyclic digraphs and construct a protocol, called ACY,
which is 0-secret.
Let us encode all possible values of θ ∈ Θ into binary strings. That is, we assume
θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Fn for some n, where F denotes the finite field {0, 1} modulo 2. Remark that
x + x = 0 for all x ∈ Fn. Throughout, a player is said to draw a key X if he chooses
an element in Fn at random with equi-probability, independently of all information he
may have. Remember that since the graph is acyclic, there exists a well-defined timing
structure such that player i is active only at time t(i).
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The protocol ACY
• Sender. Chooses a unique kS ∈ C(S) and,
– for each k ∈ C(S) \ {kS}, draws XSk and sends it to k,
– sends θ +
∑
l∈D(i)mli +
∑
k∈C(i)\{kS}XSk to player kS.
The sender chooses a specific successor kS, sends independent keys to
all his successors but kS, and sends (the sum of) all his information
(type, messages received and keys) to kS.
• Player i ∈ V\{S,R}. Chooses a unique ki ∈ C(i) and,
– for each k ∈ C(i) \ {ki}, draws Xik and sends it to k,
– sends
∑
l∈D(i)mli +
∑
k∈C(i)\{ki}Xik to player ki.
Player i chooses a specific successor ki, sends independent keys to all his
successors but ki, and sends (the sum of) all his information (messages
received and keys) to ki.
• Receiver. Computes ∑l∈D(R)mlR.
Receiver computes the sum of all messages received.
Since the graph is strongly 1-connected to R, each player i ∈ V \ {R} has at least
one successor, i.e., C(i) = ∅ for each i ∈ V \ {R}, and the protocol is well defined. If
a player has a unique successor, he simply sends (the sum of) all his information (and
does not draw keys).
3.2.2 Example.
We illustrate the protocol ACY with the example in figure 2:
Let us assume that A is the collection of all subsets of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with at most two
17
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Figure 2: This graph is weakly A-connected.
elements, so that the graph is weakly A-connected. Notice that any directed path from
the sender S to the receiver R intersects A = {1, 2}. The protocol ACY terminates in
four rounds:
Round 1. Player 3 draws a key X3 and sends it to the sender S and to player 4. Simulta-
neously, player 5 draws a key X5 and sends it to player 4 and to the receiver R.
All other players are inactive.
Round 2. Player 4 sends X3 +X5 to player 1. The sender draws a key X1, sends the key
X1 to player 1 and sends θ+X1 +X3 to player 2. All other players are inactive.
Round 3. Player 1 sends X1 +X3 +X5 to the receiver R. Player 2 sends θ +X1 +X3 to
the receiver. All other players are inactive.
Round 4. The receiver computes X5 + (X1 +X3 +X5) + (θ +X1 +X3) = θ.
Note that each player is active at only one round and that the receiver does not
need to communicate (he cannot communicate, in fact). This property of the protocol
ACY follows from the acyclicity of the graph and the existence of the timing function
(see Lemma 1).
The role of weak A-connectivity is clear. Indeed, without the undirected path
S ← 3 → 4 ← 5 → R, all paths from S to R would intersect {1, 2} and thus the
adversary would learn the secret, if the receiver is to learn it. The undirected path
S ← 3 → 4 ← 5 → R is therefore crucial. Intuitively, players 3 and 5 serve as dealers
of encoding keys, which are entangled (added) by player 4. Only the receiver is then
able to disentangle all keys and to decode correctly the message, as the subsequent
proof shows.
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3.2.3 Encoding keys and secret sharing
Before proving secrecy of this protocol, we recall a simple result about the independence
of random variables (see e.g., Theorem 8.13 (p. 229) of Shoup (2008)).
Lemma 3 Let G be a finite abelian group and X be a random variable uniformly
distributed over G. Let Y be a random variable in a finite set S such that X and Y are
independent and let f : S → G be a function. Then, the random variable Z = X+f(Y )
is independent from Y and uniformly distributed over G.
This result is well-known and the proof is straightforward. It is enough to remark that
conditionally on {Y = y}, Z = X + f(y) is a shift of X, and therefore is uniformly
distributed for each y.
Elaborating on this result, we show that linear combinations of i.i.d. uniform
random variables in Fn are stochastically independent if and only if they are linearly
independent.
Let (X1, . . . , XK) be a family of i.i.d. uniform random variables in F
n and let H be
the vector space (for the finite field F) of all Fn-valued random variables. Let also θ˜ ∈ H
be (stochastically) independent from (X1, . . . , XK). Denote H = vect{X1, . . . , XK}
the sub-vector space of H spanned by (X1, . . . , XK) and Hθ˜ = vect{θ˜, X1, . . . , XK}.
Clearly, stochastic independence implies linear independence and thus, (θ˜, X1, . . . , XK)
are linearly independent. Conversely, we have the following:
Lemma 4 1. Let Y1, . . . , YL be L linearly independent vectors in H (i.e., linear
combinations of X1, . . . , XK). Then, Y1, . . . , YL are stochastically mutually inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed.
2. Let Y1, . . . , YL be L vectors in Hθ˜ (i.e., linear combinations of X1, . . . , XK and θ˜)
such that θ˜ /∈ vect{Y1, . . . , YL}. Then, (Y1, . . . , YL) are jointly independent from
θ˜.
Proof 1. For each l = 1, . . . , L, we can write Yl =
∑K
k=1 alkXk. Since the Yl’s are
linearly independent, L ≤ K and the rank of the matrix A = (alk) is L. The dimension
of its kernel is thus K −L and the cardinality of the kernel is 2n(K−L). Then, denoting
X = (X1, . . . , XK), Y = (Y1, . . . , YK), we have
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P(Y = y) = P(AX = y) = P(AX = 0) =
2n(K−L)
2nK
= 2−nL.
Therefore, Y is uniformly distributed over (Fn)L, as desired.
2. Assume now θ˜ /∈ vect{Y1, . . . , YL}. Without loss of generality, assume that the
Yl’s are linearly independent (otherwise, replace by a maximal linearly independent
subfamily). Since Yl ∈ Hθ˜, we write Yl = al0θ˜ +
∑K
k=1 alkXk and set Y
′
l = Yl − al0θ˜.
The Y ′l ’s are in H and are linearly independent. To see this, suppose to the contrary
that there exists a non-trivial linear combination of (Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
L) such that
∑
l a
′
lY
′
l = 0.
From the definition of Y ′l , it follows that
∑
l a
′
lYl = θ˜
∑
l a
′
lal0. If
∑
l a
′
lal0 = 0, this
contradicts θ˜ /∈ vect{Y1, . . . , YL}, and if
∑
l a
′
lal0 = 0, this contradicts the assumption
that the Yl’s are linearly independent.
From point 1, we conclude that the Y ′l ’s are stochastically independent and uni-
formly distributed. By construction, they are jointly independent from θ˜. Then,
(Y1, . . . , YL) = (a10, . . . , a1L)θ˜ + (Y
′
1 , . . . , Y
′
L)
and by Lemma 3, the random vector (Y1, . . . , YL) is independent of θ˜ and uniformly
distributed over (Fn)L. 
A simple method for secret sharing (see Shamir, 1979) is easily deduced. Informally,
the aim is to “break” a secret θ into a number M of shares in such a way that one can
recover the secret from all the shares but not from any subset of shares.
Lemma 5 (Secret sharing) Let θ˜ be a random variable with values in Fn. For each
integer M > 1, there exists a family (X1, . . . , XM) of random variables such that:
1.
∑M
m=1Xm = θ˜ almost surely.
2. For each m, X−m := (Xl)l =m is uniformly distributed over (Fn)M−1 and indepen-
dent of θ˜.
Proof Let X1, . . . , XM−1 be independently and uniformly distributed over Fn, inde-
pendent of θ˜, and set XM = θ˜ +
∑M−1
m=1 Xm. Clearly,
∑M
m=1Xm = θ˜.
Moreover, since XM = X1 + θ˜ +
∑M−1
m=2 Xm and (X1, . . . , XM−1) are (linearly and
stochastically) independent, it follows that each subfamily X−m := (Xl)l =m of M − 1
elements is linearly independent. From Lemma 4, we have that X−m := (Xl)l =m are
jointly independent from θ˜, mutually independent and uniformly distributed. 
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An important consequence is that, in the specification of the protocol ACY, the
particular choice of a successor ki ∈ C(i) by player i is immaterial. From Lemma 5, all
successors of a given player i are as a matter of fact treated symmetrically. That is, any
strict subset of successors of player i, receive messages which are jointly independent
from the aggregated information of player i, whereas this information can be fully
recovered from the messages of all successors of player i. This observation allows to
give the following simple and equivalent description of the protocol ACY.
The protocol ACY
Each players adds up his information (messages and type, if sender), breaks
it into as many shares as successors, and sends one share to each successor.
3.2.4 ACY is secret
We now prove that the protocol ACY satisfies 0-secrecy.
Lemma 6 Let G be acyclic, strongly 1-connected to R and weakly A-connected from
S to R. The protocol ACY on G is 0-secret.
The proof proceeds in two claims.
Claim 1 Under the ACY protocol, the receiver correctly learns the secret, i.e. with
probability one, ∑
l∈D(R)
mlR = θ˜
Proof From the definition of the protocol,
∑
l∈D(R)mlR is a linear combination of θ˜
and of the keys drawn by the players. Consider a player i (possibly the sender) and
a key Xik, k = ki drawn by player i. This key is sent by i on two edges (ik and
iki). Each other player j sends received information on exactly one edge. It follows
that Xik travels on exactly two directed paths with origin i. Since the graph is acyclic
and strongly 1-connected, these two paths must intersect at some point (possibly at
R). The player at this point adds up the messages he receives, thus Xik cancels out
(Xik +Xik = 0). By contrast, θ˜ travels on exactly one path and is thus received by R.

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It remains to prove that no adversary A ∈ A gains additional information about θ.
Claim 2 For any set of players A such that there exists a path from S to R disjoint
from A, the messages received by players in A are jointly independent of θ˜.
It follows that if the graph is weakly A-connected from S to R, then for each A ∈ A,
the messages received by players in A are jointly independent of θ˜ (since then there
exists an undirected path from S to R, disjoint from A). We now prove this claim.
Proof Fix a set of players A such that there exists an undirected path from S to R
that contains no element ofA. Denote the undirected path P := (i0, i1, . . . , ik, . . . , iK+1),
with i0 = S, iK+1 = R, and ik ∈ A for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. We argue that even if the
adversary A observes all the shares but the ones sent on the path P , the adversary
learns nothing about the secret.
Consider the set of players P◦ on the path with no successors on the path, i.e.,
P◦ := {ik ∈ P : C(ik) ∩ P = ∅}. Note that the path changes orientation at those
players (nodes). By construction of the protocol ACY (see lemma 5), each player
ik ∈ P◦ receives a share Xik−1ik from player ik−1 ∈ P and a share Xik+1ik from player
ik+1 ∈ P . (If i0 ∈ P◦, we let Xi−1i0 = θ.)
Assume that the adversary A observes all the shares Xij such that either i ∈ P
or j ∈ P or both. In other words, we assume that the adversary observes all possible
shares but the ones sent from one player on the path P to another player on the path P .
It follows that the adversary observes all the shares of the players in P◦ and, thus, learn
Xik−1ik +Xik+1ik . Indeed, by construction of the protocol, player ik computes the sum∑
j∈D(ik)Xj,ik , breaks the sum into |C(ik)| shares and sends them to players in C(ik).
Since all the shares sent to players in C(ik) as well as all the shares (Xjik)j =ik−1,ik+1 are
observed by the adversary, the adversary learns Xik−1ik +Xik+1ik . For an illustration,
see Figure 3.
It follows that A knows (Xik−1ik + Xik+1ik)ik∈P◦ . Let ik∗ be the first element in
P◦. It is immediate to check that no linear combination of (Xik−1ik + Xik+1ik)ik∈P◦
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i0
Xi0 i1

Xi0 +Xi2
ff Xi2 i2
Xi2 i3

Xi2 +Xi4
ff Xi4 . . . iK−1
ff iK
 iK+1
XiK XiK

XiK−2 +XiK
Figure 3: The undirected path P .
gives Xik∗−1ik∗ .
8 Thus, the adversary cannot recover the share Xik∗−1ik∗ . If ik∗ = i0,
this means that the adversary learns nothing about the secret (see the second part of
Lemma 5).
Alternatively, suppose that ik∗ = i0. We first argue that ik∗−k ∈ C(ik∗−k−1) for all
k = 0, . . . , k∗−1, i.e., player ik∗−k−1 sent a share to player ik∗−k for all k = 0, . . . , k∗−1.
In other words, the path P takes the form:
i0 → i1 → · · · → ik∗−k−1 → ik∗−k → · · · → ik∗−1 → ik∗ ← ik∗−1 → · · · → iK−1 ← iK → iK+1.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists k such that ik∗−k /∈ C(ik∗−k−1),
i.e., player ik∗−k−1 does not send a share to player ik∗−k (and, thus, receive a share
from player ik∗−k). Since player ik∗−k−1 /∈ P◦, this implies that player ik∗−k−1 must
sent a share to player ik∗−k−2. In turn, this implies that player ik∗−k−2 must send a
share to player ik∗−k−3 (for otherwise, player ik∗−k−2 would be in P◦). Iterating the
argument, it follows that player i1 must send a share to player i0. Therefore, i0 ∈ P◦,
a contradiction.
Second, we argue that the adversary does not learn the share Xik∗−2ik∗−1 sent from
player ik∗−2 to player ik∗−1. Indeed, by construction of the protocol, player ik∗−1 com-
putes the sum
∑
j∈D(ik∗−1)Xjik∗−1 , breaks it into |C(ik∗−1)| shares (Xik∗−1j)j∈C(ik∗−1),
and sends the share Xik∗−1j to player j ∈ C(ik∗−1). Since ik∗ ∈ C(ik∗−1) and the ad-
versary does not learn the share Xik∗−1ik∗ , it follows that the adversary learns nothing
about Xik∗−2ik∗−1 .
Lastly, we can iterate the argument to show that the adversary learns nothing about
the share Xi0i1 and, consequently, about the secret of the sender. 
8A linear combination is the sum over a subset.
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3.2.5 δ-detection.
We show now that one can build on ACY a 0-secret protocol with δ-detection.
Lemma 7 Let G be acyclic, strongly 1-connected to R and weakly A-connected, there
exists a 0-secret protocol with δ-detection on G.
Proof We construct a super-protocol which consists in running in parallel a large
number N ≥ 1/δ of independent copies of the protocol ACY and where:
• Each player i ∈ V \ {S,R} must play his strategy in each copy of ACY and
random draws are independent across copies.
• The sender selects at random one copy with probability 1/N . Then, he inputs
the secret in the selected copy and 0 in all the other copies. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the set of possible secrets does not include the null
binary string: Θ ⊂ Fn \ {(0, . . . , 0)}.
• The receiver computes the output from each copy. If there is only one non-zero
output, he lets the decoded secret be this single non-zero value. Otherwise, the
receiver concludes that there was a deviation and declares a problem.
From the properties of the protocol ACY, in each copy of the protocol, any adver-
sary A ∈ A receives messages that are independent from θ˜. Moreover, these messages
are mutually independent across copies. Thus, the adversary gets no information about
which copy was selected by the sender. Any deviation manipulates another copy than
the one selected by the sender with probability at least 1−δ and is, therefore, detected
since it gives at least two non-zero outputs. 
3.2.6 Dispensing with acyclicity
We now explain how to construct a secret protocol on a general digraph. The trick is
to associate to the graph G, an auxiliary graph Gacy, which is strongly 1-connected,
weakly A-connected and acyclic. Then, we show how the protocol ACY on Gacy
induces the desired protocol on G. We start with the following observation.
Lemma 8 There exists an acyclic and strongly 1-connected sub-graph Ga of G.
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Proof. For each i ∈ V , consider a shortest directed path from i to R in G. Such a
shortest directed path exists since G is strongly 1-connected. Let Ga be the collection
of all these paths. We claim that Ga has the required properties. By construction, it
is strongly 1-connected. Let us show that it is acyclic. By contradiction, assume that
Ga contains the cycle i1 → i2 → . . . → iK → i1. By construction, Ga is such that
C(R) = ∅, i.e., there is no edge Ri for some i ∈ V in Ga. It follows that the cycle does
not contain the receiver. Then, there exists k ∈ {2, . . . , K} such that the shortest path
from ik to R does not follow the cycle (otherwise, R cannot be reached, a contradiction
with 1-strong connectedness). Thus, the edge ikik+1 is not on a shortest path from any
player j to R, contradicting the construction of Ga. 
Let us choose Ga to be a maximal acyclic and strongly 1-connected sub-graph of G
and let C = G\Ga be the set of edges of G that do not belong to Ga.9 Every edge of
C belongs to a cycle of G and every cycle of G contains an edge in C. Let Gacy be the
graph obtained from G by replacing each edge ij in C by two edges: i(j)i and i(j)j,
where i(j) is a fictitious player who is a duplicate of player i. That is, if ij is in C:
i → j is replaced by i ← i(j) → j.
The edges of Ga are unchanged. See Figure 4 for an example.
1
R
2
S
1
R(1)
R
2
2(S)
S
Figure 4: A cyclic graph G and the associated acyclic Gacy
Claim 3 Gacy is strongly 1-connected, weakly A-connected from S to R and acyclic.
9I.e. Ga is not a proper subgraph of a strongly 1-connected sub-graph of G.
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Proof. Each “regular” player i has a directed path to R in Ga by construction. Since
the fictitious player i(j) is directly connected to i, he also has a path to the designer
by strong 1-connectedness of G. Weak A-connectedness is clearly preserved by the
transformation. Let us show that Gacy is acyclic. Assume that Gacy contains a cycle.
By our construction, each fictitious player has only out-going edges, thus cannot belong
to a cycle. This implies that the cycle was already a cycle in G and, therefore, it should
contain an edge which belongs to C. This is a contradiction because edges in C no longer
appear in Gacy. 
Now, we construct a secret protocol on G by emulating the protocol ACY on Gacy.
The timing is the one given by the acyclic structure of Gacy. Each player i who has
duplicates in Gacy should play first for his duplicates (at the first round since duplicates
have no predecessors) and then at round t(i) prescribed by the timing structure of
Gacy. There, he should treat the messages he did choose for his duplicates as messages
received by predecessors.
The secrecy of ACY on Gacy clearly implies that the induced protocol is secret on
G (if a duplicated player belongs to the adversary, the messages sent by his duplicates
are independent of the secret and all other messages and thus convey no information).
As in the previous section, one obtains a protocol with δ-detection by running in
parallel a large number of independent copies of this protocol.
4 Security
We now present our main characterization for strong security (the adversary can now
deviate from the protocol). Denote 0A the strategy of the adversary A, which consists
in sending the null message, regardless of the history.
Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. For each A ∈ A, the graph G\A contains a sub-graph that is strongly 1-connected
to R, and weakly A-connected from S to R.
2. For any ε > 0, there exists an ε-strongly secure protocol.
3. For any ε > 0, there exists a protocol 〈σ, θd〉 such that 〈(0A, σ−A), θd〉 is ε-secret
for any A ∈ A.
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Figure 5: An example
In words, the connectivity conditions we obtain are as follows. Firstly, for any adversary
A, there must exists a directed path from S to R in G \A. Secondly, consider the sub-
graph of G \ A made of all players in G \ A who have a directed path to R. Then,
this sub-graph must be weakly A-connected, namely for any A′ ∈ A, there must be an
undirected path in this sub-graph that does not intersect A ∪ A′.
To get some intuition for Theorem 2, consider the simple example introduced in
Figure 5.
Assume that the adversary is A = {1, 2}. It is clear that if players 1 and 2 stop
communicating with the receiver, then the sender cannot communicate at all with the
receiver and thus cannot communicate his secret. Thus, for any adversary A, we need
at least one directed path from the sender to the receiver that does not intersect A.
However, this is not sufficient to guarantee secrecy. From Theorem 1, for each adversary
A′, there must exist a path from the sender to the receiver that does not intersect A′
to guarantee secrecy. So, if the adversary A stops communicating, we would need the
sub-graph G\A to be weakly A-connected if we want achieve strong security. Theorem
2 states that it is not only a sufficient condition, but also a necessary one. Moreover,
Theorem 2 also states that simple faults (i.e., to simply stop communicating) are the
worst possible deviations.
We prove first sufficiency (1) ⇒ (2), then necessity (3) ⇒ (1), (2) ⇒ (3) is obvious.
4.1 Sufficiency [(1) =⇒ (2)]
Fix ε > 0 and set ε′ = ε/|A|. Since for each A ∈ A, the graph G \ A contains a
sub-graph that is strongly connected and weakly A-connected from S to R, Theorem
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1 applies. Therefore, there exists a protocol 〈σA, θAd 〉 on the strongly connected and
weakly A-connected sub-graph of G \A, which guarantees 0-secrecy with ε′-detection.
Consider the protocol 〈σ, θd〉 which consists in running in parallel all protocols
〈σA, θAd 〉, A ∈ A. The strategy of each i ∈ V is σi := (σAi ){A: i∈A}. The decoding
rule is such that as soon as one protocol 〈σA, θAd 〉 succeeds, i.e., does not end with a
problem, the receiver selects the output from one of the successful protocols. Precisely,
fix a linear order < on A, and for each terminal history hT+1R of the receiver, denote
A∗(hT+1R ) the least (according to <) A ∈ A such that θAd (hT+1R ) ∈ Θ, i.e., the first
adversary for which the receiver does not detect a problem in the protocol 〈σA, θAd 〉.
The decoding function θd is then θd(h
T+1
R ) = θ
A∗(hT+1R )
d (h
T+1
R ) for each h
T+1
R .
This protocol is 0-secret by construction: each sub-protocol 〈σA, θAd 〉 is, and these
sub-protocols are mutually independent. An adversary cannot learn information about
the secret by deviating. However, he could perturb the decoding and induce the receiver
to output a wrong value. Fix an adversary A ∈ A. Since no node in A is active in
the protocol 〈σA, θAd 〉, the adversary cannot affect the outcome of 〈σA, θAd 〉. It follows
that the above decoding function is well-defined. However, there is no guarantee that
A = A∗(hT+1R ) for each h
T+1
R . Assume that the adversary manipulates 〈σB, θBd 〉 with
B = A, in such a way that the receiver outputs a wrong value θBd = θ˜. The probability
of this event is at most ε′. In this case, if A∗(hT+1R ) = B, the receiver outputs a wrong
value from the full protocol. Thus, the probability of wrong output is at most the
probability that there exists B ∈ A such that A∗(hT+1R ) = B and θBd = θ˜, which is at
most |A|ε′ = ε. Thus, 〈σ, θd〉 is ε-strongly secure.
4.2 Necessity [(3) ⇒ (1)]
The key of the proof is the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Consider two disjoint subsets of nodes U and V . Let U be the set of nodes
i ∈ V \ U such that all directed paths from i to some j ∈ V , go through U .
For all τU , τ˜U , σ−(U∪U), and for every history h
T+1
V of V , we have
P0U ,τU ,σ−(U∪U)(h
T+1
V ) = P0U ,τ˜U ,σ−(U∪U)(h
T+1
V ).
The proof is in Appendix. The intuitive meaning of this lemma is the following.
Nodes in U are separated from V by U , in the sense that messages from nodes in U
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to recipients in V are “filtered” by nodes in U . If U adopts the strategy 0U , then all
nodes in U send no message and therefore communication from U to V is disrupted.
Consequently, the messages received by V do not depend on the strategy used by U .
We prove now [(3) ⇒ (1)] by contradiction. Suppose that there exists A∗ ∈ A
such that G \ A∗ does not contain a sub-graph that is strongly connected and weakly
A-connected. Let A∗ the set of all nodes i ∈ V \ A∗ such that all directed paths from
i to R go through A∗ (i.e., in G \ A∗, the nodes in A∗ have no directed paths to the
receiver R).
Assume first S ∈ A∗, and apply Lemma 9, with U = A∗ and V = {R}. It follows
that under the protocol 〈(0A∗ , σ−A∗), θd〉, the history of V , i.e., the receiver, does not
depend on the value of θ˜ and thus 〈(0A∗ , σ−A∗), θd〉 cannot be ε-secret, for any ε.
Assume now S /∈ A∗. By construction of A∗, the sub-graph G\(A∗∪ A∗) of G\A∗ is
(maximally) strongly connected and includes the sender S. Therefore, there must exist
A ∈ A such that all paths from S to R intersect A, i.e., the sub-graph G \ (A∗ ∪ A∗) is
not weakly A-connected. Note that A∗ ∪ A∗ ∪ A is cut of the graph G, i.e., all paths
from S to R intersect A∗ ∪ A∗ ∪ A. If A∗ ∪ A∗ ∪ A ∈ A, the result follows from the
necessity part of Theorem 1, so let us assume that this is not the case.
We apply Lemma 9 with U = A∗, U = A∗ and V = {R} ∪ A. It follows that
P0A∗ ,τ A∗ ,σ−(A∗∪ A∗)
(hT+1R , h
T+1
A ) does not depend on τ A∗ and thus, we may assume without
loss of generality that τ A∗ = 0 A∗ . (Note that there is no directed path from a node
in A∗ to a node in A that does not intersect A∗, since any node in A has a directed
path to R in G \ ( A∗ ∪ A∗).) We claim that there cannot exist an ε-strongly secure
protocol. By contradiction, suppose that for ε > 0, there exists a protocol 〈σ, θd〉 which
is ε-strongly secure. This means that
P0A∗ ,τ A∗ ,σ−(A∗∪ A∗),θd
(θ˜ = θ|hT+1A ) = P (θ˜ = θ)
and
∀θ ∈ Θ,P0A∗ ,τ A∗ ,σ−(A∗∪ A∗),θd(θˆd = θ˜|θ˜ = θ) > 1− ε.
From Lemma 9, this implies
P0A∗ ,0 A∗ ,σ−(A∗∪ A∗),θd
(θ˜ = θ|hT+1A ) = P (θ˜ = θ)
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and
∀θ ∈ Θ,P0A∗ ,0 A∗ ,σ−(A∗∪ A∗),θd(θˆd = θ˜|θ˜ = θ) > 1− ε.
This means that the protocol induced by 〈0A∗ , 0 A∗ , σ−(A∗∪ A∗)〉 on the restricted
graph G\ (A∗∪ A∗) is ε-secret. This contradicts Theorem 1 as G\ (A∗∪ A∗) is strongly
connected but not weakly A-connected. The proof is thus complete.
5 Open questions
5.1 A weaker notion of security
As already alluded to, our notion of strong security is more stringent that the classical
definition of security, which is as follows.
Definition 6 A protocol 〈σ, θd〉 is ε-secure if it satisfies the following requirements:
1. The receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1 − ε, i.e., for all A ∈ A,
for all τA, PτA,σ−A(θˆd = θ˜) ≥ 1− ε.
2. No adversary gets information about the secret, i.e., for all A ∈ A, for all τA,
for all hT+1A , PτA,σ−A(θ˜ = θ|hT+1A ) = P (θ˜ = θ).
A protocol is ε-secure if the receiver learns the secret with arbitrarily high proba-
bility, regardless of the behavior of adversary. Moreover, no adversary can gain infor-
mation by deviating. However, if an adversary deviates from the protocol, information
may be leaked to other players. In other words, by contrast with the concept of strong
security, secrecy is not maintained when adversaries deviate from the protocol.
To see the difference between security and strong security, consider the graph G
below with A the set of all singletons. The graph G\{3} does not contain a sub-graph
that is strongly connected and weakly A-connected, while all others do. From Theorem
2, there is therefore no strongly ε-secure protocol on G for all ε > 0. Yet, we claim
that ε-security can be achieved.
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For any ε > 0, we construct a protocol, which consists of six sub-protocols run
in parallel, one for each possible adversary. For each adversary A = {3}, we run the
protocol ACY with ε-detection on the sub-graph G \ A. Since for each A = {3}, the
G \ A is strongly 1-connected and weakly A-connected, Theorem 1 guarantees that
the protocol is 0-secret with ε-detection. For the adversary {3}, the sub-protocol is
described as follows:
Round 1. Player 1 draws X1 and sends it to the sender S and player 6. Simultaneously,
player 5 draws X5 and sends it to the receiver R and player 2. All other players
are inactive.
Round 2. The sender S draws ZS and Z
′
S and sends (θ+X1, ZS, Z
′
S) to player 4 and (ZS, Z
′
S)
to player 2. All other players are inactive.
Round 3. Player 2 computes Y5 = ZSX5 + Z
′
S and sends (X5, Y5) to player 3. All other
players are inactive.
Round 4. Player 3 forwards (X5, Y5) to player 4. All other players are inactive.
Round 5. Let (X ′5, Y
′
5) be the message received from player 3 by player 4. Player 4 tests
whether Y ′5 = ZSX
′
5 + Z
′
S.
– If the test succeeds, he sends (θ +X1 +X
′
5, ok) to player 6.
– If the test fails, he sends (θ +X1, problem) to player 6.
All other players are inactive.
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Round 6. – If player 6 receives a message with “ok,” he sends (θ+X1+X
′
5+X1, ok) to
the receiver R.
– If player 6 receives a message with “problem,” he sends (θ+X1+X1, problem)
to the receiver R.
All other players are inactive.
Round 7. – If the receiver R receives a message with “ok,” he decodes (θ +X1 +X
′
5 +
X1) +X5.
– If the receiverR receives a message with “problem,” he decodes (θ+X1+X1).
All other players are inactive.
Clearly, if all players abide by the sub-protocol, the receiver correctly learns the
secret. Moreover, if player 3 deviates from the sub-protocol, the deviation is detected
whenever Y ′5 = ZSX ′5 + Z ′S (an authentication test). The probability of detection can
be made arbitrarily large, in particular larger than 1 − ε, by taking keys in Fn for n
large enough.
Finally, the receiver fixes an arbitrary order on the six sub-protocols and decodes
the secret according to the first sub-protocol for which no deviation is detected. If the
receiver detects a deviation in all sub-protocols, he decodes the secret according to the
sub-protocol constructed for the adversary {3}. By construction, the probability that
an adversary deviates from the protocol and is not detected is at most ε, so that we
indeed achieve ε-security. However, we do not achieve strong ε-security. To see this,
suppose that the adversary is player 3. Note that he is active in all sub-protocols. If he
deviates in all sub-protocols, the deviation is detected with probability at least 1 − ε,
in which case the receiver correctly learns the secret from player 6 (in the execution
of the sub-protocol constructed for 3). However, in this case, player 6 also learns the
secret, which violates strong ε-security.
An open problem is to characterize the directed graphs for which ε-security can be
achieved for all ε > 0.
5.2 Perfect security
Another open problem is to characterize the networks for which 0-secrecy and 0-strong
security can be achieved. To formulate a guess, let us assume that A is the set of
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coalitions with at most k elements, and compare our conditions with those of Dolev et
al. (1993).10 We recall that they only treat networks with vertex disjoint paths, that
is, graphs made of parallel lines. Yet, their conditions give intuitions for the general
case.
The condition in our main theorem is similar to weak 2k+1-connectivity: removing
2k nodes does not disconnect the sender from the receiver in the undirected graph. This
is analogous to the result of Dolev et al. regarding undirected, i.e. 2-way networks,
where 2k + 1-connectivity is required. For 1-way networks Dolev et al. show that
3k + 1-connectivity is required. By analogy, we conjecture the following:
Perfect security can be achieved if and only if for each pair A,A′ ∈ A, the graph
G\A∪A′ contains a sub-graph that is strongly connected and weakly A-connected from
S to R.
6 Appendix
Lemma 2 Let S1, S2 and S3 be three disjoint subsets of nodes such all paths from S1
to S3 intersect S2, i.e., S2 is a cut of the graph. For any σ, for any t, for any h
t,
we have Pσ(h
t)Pσ(h
t
2) = Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2)Pσ(h
t
2, h
t
3), where h
t
1 = (h
t
i)i∈S1, h
t
2 = (h
t
i)i∈S2, and
ht3 = (h
t
i)i∈S3.
Proof Let G be a directed graph and G the undirected graph obtained from G.
Assume that G is connected. Consider three disjoint subsets S1, S2 and S3 of players
such that all paths from players in S1 to players in S3 intersects S2, i.e., S2 is a cut of
the graph G. Let S∗1 (resp., S
∗
3) be the connected component of G \ S2 that includes
S1 (resp., S3). Since S2 is a cut, we have that S
∗
1 ∩S∗3 = ∅ and if i /∈ S1 ∪S2 ∪S3, then
either i ∈ S∗1 or i ∈ S∗3 . And, of course, all paths from S∗1 to S∗3 intersect S2.
We prove Lemma 2 with S1 = S
∗
1 and S3 = S
∗
3 . The complete proof follows easily
from this case by summing over the relevant histories htS∗1\S1 and h
t
S∗3\S3 .
So, we want to prove that for any σ, for any t, for any ht, we have Pσ(h
t)Pσ(h
t
2) =
Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2)Pσ(h
t
2, h
t
3), where h
t
1 = (h
t
i)i∈S1 , h
t
2 = (h
t
i)i∈S2 , and h
t
3 = (h
t
i)i∈S3 .
We first prove Lemma 2 for an auxiliary game with three players: 1, 2 and 3. We
may think of player i in that auxiliary game as a representative of the players in the
10Dolev et al. study, among others, the problem of 0-secrecy and 0-security.
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set Si. The auxiliary game has T stages with imperfect observation.
At each stage t, player 1 chooses an action (a, α), player 2 an action (β, b, γ), and
player 3 an action (c, δ). At the end of stage t, player 1 observes β, player 2 observes
α and δ, and player 3 observes γ.
The action a corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S1 to nodes in S1, while
the action α corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S1 to S2. Similarly, the
action β corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S2 to nodes in S1, the action
b to the messages sent by nodes in S2 to S2 and the action γ to the messages sent by
nodes in S2 to S3. Lastly, the action c corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in
S3 to S3 and the action δ to the messages sent by nodes in S3 to nodes in S2.
A t-period history is a vector ht = (x1, ..., xt) with xs = (as, αs, βs, bs, γs, cs, δs)
the actions played at stage s, s ≤ t. Denote ht1 player 1’s history at stage t, i.e.,
ht1 = (as, αs, βs)s≤t. Similarly, h
t
2 = (αs, βs, bs, γs, δs)s≤t, and h
t
3 = (γs, cs, δs)s≤t.
The proof is by induction on t. Let t = 1 and consider the history h1 = (a1, α1, β1, b1, γ1, c1, δ1).
We have
Pσ(h
1) = σ1(a1, α1)σ2(β1, b1, γ1)σ3(c1, δ1),
Pσ(h
1
2) = σ1(α1)σ2(β1, b1, γ1)σ3(δ1),
Pσ(h
1
1, h
1
2) = σ1(a1, α1)σ2(β1, b1, γ1)σ3(δ1),
Pσ(h
1
3, h
1
2) = σ3(c1, δ1)σ2(β1, b1, γ1)σ1(α1),
which establishes the statement for t = 1.
Let us suppose that the statement is true for t, i.e., Pσ(h
t)Pσ(h
t
2) = Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2)Pσ(h
t
2, h
t
3).
Consider the history ht+1 = (ht, at+1, αt+1, βt+1, bt+1, γt+1, ct+1, δt+1), with
ht = (as, αs, βs, bs, γs, cs, δs)s≤t.
Firstly, we have
Pσ(h
t+1) = Pσ(h
t)Pσ(at+1, αt+1, βt+1, bt+1, γt+1, ct+1, δt+1|ht),
= Pσ(h
t)P (at+1, αt+1|ht)Pσ(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht)Pσ(ct+1, δt+1|ht),
= Pσ(h
t)σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)σ3(ct+1, δt+1|ht3). (1)
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Secondly, we have that
Pσ(h
t+1
1 , h
t+1
2 ) =
∑
c′1,...,c
′
t+1
Pσ(h
t+1
1 , h
t+1
2 , c
′
1, ..., c
′
t+1)
=
∑
c′1,..,c
′
t+1
(
Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2, c
′
1, ..., c
′
t)σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)
σ3(c
′
t+1, δt+1|γ1, .., γt, δ1, .., δt, c′1, .., c′t)
)
,
= σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)∑
c′1,...,c
′
t+1
Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2, c
′
1, ..., c
′
t)σ3(c
′
t+1, δt+1|ht1, ht2, c′1, ..., c′t),
= σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)∑
c′1,...,c
′
t
Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2, c
′
1, ..., c
′
t)σ3(δt+1|ht1, ht2, c′1, ..., c′t),
= σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)Pσ(ht1, ht2, δt+1),
= σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)Pσ(ht1, ht2)Pσ(δt+1|ht1, ht2).
We also have that Pσ(δt+1|ht1, ht2) =
∑
c′1,...,c
′
t
Pσ(c
′
1, ..., c
′
t|ht1, ht2)Pσ(δt+1|ht1, ht2, c′1, ..., c′t).
Moreover, it follows from the induction hypothesis that Pσ(c
′
1, ..., c
′
t|ht1, ht2) = Pσ(c′1, ..., c′t|ht2)
and from the definition of player 3 strategy that Pσ(δt+1|ht1, ht2, c′1, ..., c′t) = Pσ(δt+1|ht2, c′1, ..., c′t).
Consequently, we have
Pσ(δt+1|ht1, ht2) =
∑
c′1,...,c
′
t
Pσ(c
′
1, ..., c
′
t|ht2)Pσ(δt+1|ht2, c′1, ..., c′t) = Pσ(δt+1|ht2).
Finally, it follows that
Pσ(h
t+1
1 , h
t+1
2 ) = σ1(at+1, αt+1|ht1)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)Pσ(ht1, ht2)Pσ(δt+1|ht2). (2)
Thirdly, exchanging the role of players 1 and 3, we obtain
Pσ(h
t+1
3 , h
t+1
2 ) = σ3(ct+1, δt+1|ht3)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)Pσ(ht3, ht2)Pσ(αt+1|ht2). (3)
From equations (1), (2) and (3), we obtain:
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Pσ(h
t+1
3 , h
t+1
2 )Pσ(h
t+1
1 , h
t+1
2 )
Pσ(ht+1)
=
Pσ(h
t
1, h
t
2)Pσ(δt+1|ht2)Pσ(ht3, ht2)Pσ(αt+1|ht2)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)
Pσ(ht)
.
From the induction hypothesis, we have:
Pσ(h
t+1
2 , h
t+1
3 )Pσ(h
t+1
1 , h
t+1
2 )
Pσ(ht+1)
= Pσ(h
t
2)σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2)Pσ(δt+1|ht2)Pσ(αt+1|ht2).
(4)
It remains to show that the right-hand side of Equation 4 is actually Pσ(h
t+1
2 ).
To save space, denote Σ2 = σ2(βt+1, bt+1, γt+1|ht2) and let us compute Pσ(ht+12 |ht2).
Pσ(h
t+1
2 |ht2) =∑
a′1,..,a
′
t,c
′
1,...,c
′
t
Pσ(a
′
1, .., a
′
t, c
′
1, ..., c
′
t|ht2)Pσ(ht+12 |a′1, .., a′t, c′1, .., c′t, ht2) =
∑
a′1,..,a
′
t,c
′
1,...,c
′
t
Pσ(a
′
1, .., a
′
t, c
′
1, ..., c
′
t|ht2)Σ2Pσ(δt+1|a′1, .., a′t, c′1, ..., c′t, ht2)Pσ(αt+1|a′1, .., a′t, c′1, .., c′t, ht2).
Finally, it follows from the induction hypothesis that
Pσ(a
′
1, .., a
′
t, c
′
1, ..., c
′
t|ht2) = Pσ(a′1, .., a′t|ht2)Pσ(c′1, ..., c′t|ht2),
and from the definition of player 2 strategies that
Pσ(δt+1|a′1, .., a′t, c′1, .., c′t, ht2) = Pσ(δt+1|c′1, .., c′t, ht2),
and
Pσ(αt+1|a′1, .., a′t, c′1, .., c′t, ht2) = Pσ(αt+1|a′1, .., a′t, ht2).
Therefore, we have
Pσ(h
t+1
2 |ht2) =
Σ2
⎛
⎝ ∑
a′1,..,a
′
t,c
′
1,...,c
′
t
Pσ(a
′
1, .., a
′
t|ht2)Pσ(c′1, ..., c′t|ht2)Pσ(δt+1|c′1, .., c′t, ht2)Pσ(αt+1|a′1, ..., a′t, ht2)
⎞
⎠
= Σ2Pσ(δt+1|ht2)Pσ(αt+1|ht2).
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It follows that the right-hand side of Equation 4 is Pσ(h
t+1
2 |ht2)Pσ(ht2) = Pσ(ht+12 ),
as required.
To complete the proof, it is enough to adapt the strategies to the information players
actually have and to interpret the actions as messages sent and received (remember
that Lemma 2 holds for the auxiliary game, regardless of the strategy profile). 
Lemma 9 Consider two disjoint subsets of nodes U and V . Let U be the set of nodes
i ∈ V \ U such that all directed paths from i to some j ∈ V , go through U .
For all τU , τ˜U , σ−(U∪U), and for every history h
T+1
V of V , we have
P0U ,τU ,σ−(U∪U)(h
T+1
V ) = P0U ,τ˜U ,σ−(U∪U)(h
T+1
V ).
Proof First, note that U is disjoint from V and that V ⊆ V ′ := V \ (U ∪ U).
Moreover, for each i ∈ V ′ and each j ∈ D(i), we have j /∈ U . To see this, suppose
that j ∈ U . If there exists a directed path from i to k ∈ V that does not intersect U ,
then there exists a path from j to k ∈ V that does not intersect U , a contradiction
with j ∈ U . So, either all directed paths from i to any k ∈ V intersect U or there is
no directed path from i to k ∈ V . From the definition of U , it follows that i ∈ U , a
contradiction with i ∈ V ′ since V ′ and U are disjoint.
It follows that ∪i∈V ′D(i) := D(V ′) ⊆ V ′ ∪ U .
Recall that hti denotes an history of messages sent and received by node i up
to round t and let htV ′ := (h
t
i)i∈V ′ the profile of histories of nodes in V
′. We com-
plete the proof by induction on t. For t = 2, we clearly have that P0U ,τU ,σV ′ (h
2
V ′) =
P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (h
2
V ′) since D(V
′) ⊆ V ′ ∪ U and V ′ is disjoint from U . Assume that for t > 2
we have P0U ,τU ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′) = P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′). Note that the history h
t+1
V ′ at round t + 1 is
(htV ′ ,m
t+1
V ′ ,m
t+1
D(V ′)), where m
t+1
V ′ are the messages sent by nodes in V
′ and mt+1D(V ′) the
messages received. Then,
P0U ,τU ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′ ,m
t+1
V ′ ) = P0U ,τU ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′)P0U ,τU ,σV ′ (m
t+1
V ′ |htV ′),
= P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′)σV ′(h
t
V ′)[m
t+1
V ′ ],
= P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′)P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (m
t+1
V ′ |htV ′),
= P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (h
t
V ′ ,m
t+1
V ′ ).
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Since D(V ′) ⊆ V ′ ∪U , we can write mt+1D(V ′) as (mt+1D(V ′)∩U ,mt+1D(V ′)∩V ′). By definition
of 0U , the first element is the null message m0, regardless of the history and, thus, is in-
dependent of τU . Finally, the induction hypothesis implies that P0U ,τU ,σV ′ (m
t+1
D(V ′)∩V ′) =
P0U ,τ˜U ,σV ′ (m
t+1
D(V ′)∩V ′). This completes the proof of Lemma 9. 
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